Efficient two-party password-based key exchange protocols in the UC framework. (English) Zbl 1153.94340
Malkin, Tal (ed.), Topics in cryptology – CT-RSA 2008. The cryptographers’ track at the RSA conference 2008, San Francisco, CA, USA, April 8–11, 2008. Proceedings. Berlin: Springer (ISBN 978-3-540-79262-8/pbk). Lecture Notes in Computer Science 4964, 335-351 (2008).
Summary: Most of the existing password-based authenticated key exchange protocols have proofs either in the indistinguishability-based security model of Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway (BPR) or in the simulation-based of Boyko, MacKenzie, and Patel (BMP). Though these models provide a security level that is sufficient for most applications, they fail to consider some realistic scenarios such as participants running the protocol with different but possibly related passwords. To overcome these deficiencies, Canetti et al. proposed a new security model in the universal composability (UC) framework which makes no assumption on the distribution on passwords used by the protocol participants. They also proposed a new protocol, but, unfortunately, the latter is not as efficient as some of the existing protocols in BPR and BMP models. In this paper, we investigate whether some of the existing protocols that were proven secure in BPR and BMP models can also be proven secure in the new UC model and we answer this question in the affirmative. More precisely, we show that the protocol by Bresson, Chevassut, and Pointcheval (BCP) in CCS 2003 is also secure in the new UC model. The proof of security relies in the random-oracle and ideal-cipher models and works even in the presence of adaptive adversaries, capable of corrupting players at any time and learning their internal states.
|94A62||Authentication and secret sharing|