zbMATH — the first resource for mathematics

Geometry Search for the term Geometry in any field. Queries are case-independent.
Funct* Wildcard queries are specified by * (e.g. functions, functorial, etc.). Otherwise the search is exact.
"Topological group" Phrases (multi-words) should be set in "straight quotation marks".
au: Bourbaki & ti: Algebra Search for author and title. The and-operator & is default and can be omitted.
Chebyshev | Tschebyscheff The or-operator | allows to search for Chebyshev or Tschebyscheff.
"Quasi* map*" py: 1989 The resulting documents have publication year 1989.
so: Eur* J* Mat* Soc* cc: 14 Search for publications in a particular source with a Mathematics Subject Classification code (cc) in 14.
"Partial diff* eq*" ! elliptic The not-operator ! eliminates all results containing the word elliptic.
dt: b & au: Hilbert The document type is set to books; alternatively: j for journal articles, a for book articles.
py: 2000-2015 cc: (94A | 11T) Number ranges are accepted. Terms can be grouped within (parentheses).
la: chinese Find documents in a given language. ISO 639-1 language codes can also be used.

a & b logic and
a | b logic or
!ab logic not
abc* right wildcard
"ab c" phrase
(ab c) parentheses
any anywhere an internal document identifier
au author, editor ai internal author identifier
ti title la language
so source ab review, abstract
py publication year rv reviewer
cc MSC code ut uncontrolled term
dt document type (j: journal article; b: book; a: book article)
A new revenue sharing mechanism for coordinating multi-echelon supply chains. (English) Zbl 1193.90047
Summary: A new type of revenue sharing (RS) contract mechanism for multi-echelon supply chains between the most downstream entity and all upstream entities is proposed. The new RS contract is analyzed in the linear supply chain setting facing stochastic demand. Advantages over mechanisms with RS contracts between all pairs of adjacent entities are discussed and demonstrated.
90B06Transportation, logistics
90B50Management decision making, including multiple objectives
[1]Burnetas, A.; Gilbert, S. M.; Smith, C. E.: Quantity discounts in single-period supply contracts with asymmetric demand information, IIE transactions 39, 465-479 (2007)
[2]Cachon, G. P.: Supply chain coordination with contracts, Supply chain management: design, coordination and operation, 229-339 (2003)
[3]Cachon, G. P.; Lariviere, M. A.: Supply chain coordination with revenue sharing contracts: strengths and limitations, Management science 51, 30-44 (2005) · Zbl 1232.90173 · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
[4]Dana, J. D.; Spier, K. E.: Revenue sharing, demand uncertainty and vertical control of competing firms, Journal of industrial economics 49, 223-245 (2001)
[5]Emmons, H.; Gilbert, S. M.: The role of returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions for catalogue goods, Management science 44, 276-283 (1998) · Zbl 0989.90043 · doi:10.1287/mnsc.44.2.276
[6]Gerchak, Y.; Wang, Y.: Revenue sharing vs. Wholesale price contracts in assembly systems with random demand, Production and operations management 13, 23-33 (2004)
[7]Giannoccaro, I.; Pontrandolfo, P.: Supply chain coordination by revenue sharing contracts, International journal production economics 89, 131-139 (2004)
[8]L.Y. Hu, Y.Q. Chunyu, Z.-S. Jiang, Research on the coordination mechanism model of the three-level supply chain, in: 14th International Conference on Management Science & Engineering, Aug. 2007, Harbin, China, pp. 734–739.
[9]Jeuland, A.; Shugan, S.: Managing channel profits, Marketing science 2, 239-272 (1983)
[10]S.F. Ji, M.J. Liu, L.J. Han, The three-stage supply chain coordination by revenue sharing contracts, in; Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE International Conference on Grey Systems and Intelligent Services, Nov. 2007, Nanjing, China, pp. 1216–1220.
[11]Koulamas, C.: A newsvendor problem with revenue sharing and channel coordination, Decision sciences 37, 91-100 (2006)
[12]Lee, H.; Whang, S.: Decentralized multi-echelon supply chains: incentives and information, Management science 45, 633-640 (1999) · Zbl 1231.90094 · doi:10.1287/mnsc.45.5.633
[13]Li, C. L.: Quantifying supply chain ineffectiveness under uncoordinated pricing decisions, Operations research letters 36, 83-88 (2008) · Zbl 1138.90410 · doi:10.1016/j.orl.2007.04.005
[14]J.H. Mortimer, The effects of revenue-sharing contracts on welfare in vertically-separated markets: Evidence from video rental industry, Discussion paper No. 1964, Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Harvard University, 2002.
[15]V.R. Nalla, Contract mechanisms for coordinating operational and marketing decisions in a supply chain: models and analysis. Ph.D. Thesis, Nyenrode Business Universiteit, The Netherlands, 2008.
[16]Pasternack, B. A.: Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities, Marketing science 4, 166-176 (1985)
[17]Spengler, J.: Vertical integration and antitrust policy, Journal of political economy, 347-352 (1950)
[18]Tsay, A.: The quantity flexibility contract and supplier-customer incentives, Management science 45, 1339-1358 (1999) · Zbl 1231.90065 · doi:10.1287/mnsc.45.10.1339
[19]Tsay, A.; Lovejoy, W. S.: Quantity flexibility contracts and supply chain performance, Manufacturing service operations management 1, 89-111 (1998)
[20]Van Der Veen, J. A. A.; Venugopal, V.: Using revenue sharing to create win–win in the video rental supply chain, Journal of operational research society 56, 757-762 (2005) · Zbl 1084.90012 · doi:10.1057/palgrave.jors.2601879
[21]Weng, S.: Coordination in operations: A taxonomy, Journal of operations management 12, 413-422 (1995)