Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment. (English) Zbl 0999.91001

We study the importance of conditional cooperation in a one-shot public goods game by using a variant of the strategy-method. We find that a third of the subjects can be classified as free riders, whereas 50% are conditional cooperators.


91A90 Experimental studies
91B18 Public goods


Full Text: DOI


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