Analysis of a two-stage telecommunication supply chain with technology dependent demand.

*(English)*Zbl 1114.90043Summary: We analyze a two-stage telecommunication supply chain consisting of one operator and one vendor under a multiple period setting. The operator faces a stochastic market demand which depends on technology investment level. The decision variables for the operator are the initial technology investment level and the capacity of the network for each period. The capacity that the operator installs in one period also remains available in subsequent periods. The operator can increase or decrease the available capacity at each period. For this model, an algorithm to find the centralized optimal solution is proposed. A profit sharing contract where firms share both the revenue and operating costs generated throughout the periods along with initial technology investment is suggested. Also a coordinating quantity discount contract where the discount on the price depends on the total installed capacity is designed. The case where the vendor decides on the technology investment level and the operator decides on the capacity of the network is also analyzed and it is shown that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium.

##### MSC:

90B50 | Management decision making, including multiple objectives |

90B18 | Communication networks in operations research |

91A40 | Other game-theoretic models |

##### Keywords:

supply chain management; contract design; multiple period revenue sharing; Nash equilibrium
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\textit{E. Çanakoğlu} and \textit{T. Bilgiç}, Eur. J. Oper. Res. 177, No. 2, 995--1012 (2007; Zbl 1114.90043)

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