Dekel, Eddie; Lipman, Barton L.; Rustichini, Aldo; Sarver, Todd Representing preferences with a unique subjective state space: a corrigendum. (English) Zbl 1132.91421 Econometrica 75, No. 2, 591-600 (2007). Summary: E. Dekel, B. L. Lipman and A. Rustichini [Econometrica 69, No. 4, 891–934 (2001; Zbl 1026.91032)] (henceforth DLR) axiomatically characterized three representations of preferences that allow for a desire for flexibility and/or commitment. In one of these representations (ordinal expected utility), the independence axiom is stated in a weaker form than is necessary to obtain the representation; in another (additive expected utility), the continuity axiom is too weak. In this erratum we provide examples showing that the axioms used by DLR are not sufficient, and provide stronger versions of these axioms that, together with the other axioms used by DLR, are necessary and sufficient for these two representations. Cited in 1 ReviewCited in 23 Documents MSC: 91B16 Utility theory Keywords:subjective state space; expected utility; preference for commitment; preference for flexibility Citations:Zbl 1026.91032 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{E. Dekel} et al., Econometrica 75, No. 2, 591--600 (2007; Zbl 1132.91421) Full Text: DOI