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Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations. (English) Zbl 1281.91093
Summary: We consider the mechanism design problem when agents’ types are multidimensional and continuous, and their valuations are interdependent. If there are at least three agents whose types satisfy a weak correlation condition, then for any decision rule and any \(\varepsilon > 0\) there exist balanced transfers that render truthful revelation a Bayesian \(\varepsilon\)-equilibrium. A slightly stronger correlation condition ensures that there exist balanced transfers that induce a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which agents’ strategies are nearly truthful.

MSC:
91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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