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Perception games and privacy. (English) Zbl 1393.91021
Summary: Players have privacy concerns that may affect their choice of actions in strategic settings. We use a variant of signaling games to model this effect and study its relation to pooling behavior, misrepresentation of information, and inefficiency.

MSC:
91A28 Signaling and communication in game theory
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