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**A game-theory model of a one-sided auction.**
*(English.
Russian original)*
Zbl 0931.91016

Mosc. Univ. Comput. Math. Cybern. 1997, No. 3, 39-45 (1997); translation from Vestn. Mosk. Univ., Ser. XV 1997, No. 3, 26-31 (1997).

Auctions are an important part of the market economics. There are two kinds of auctions: one-sided auctions in which prices are proposed by sellers or by consumers only and two-sided auctions in which prices are proposed by both groups of the auction participants. A one-sided auction in which the prices are proposed by consumers only is considered in the article. Rational strategies of the behavior of the auction participants are discussed. An optimal principle of the game-theoretic model such as elimination of dominated strategies is used. As a result the upper and the lower estimates of deviations of the predicted prices of the auction from those calculated on the base of the competitive equilibrium model are found.

Reviewer: S.G.Zhuravlev (Moskva)