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On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions. (English) Zbl 0633.90005

A social choice function satisfying a “dual dominance” condition is Maskin monotonic if and only if it is constant. Hence, any non-constant social choice function satisfying dual dominance is not Nash implementable. Among the important examples are all social choice functions on unrestricted domains. On the other hand, non-constant social choice functions such as a Walrasian performance function in economic environments need not satisfy dual dominance.

MSC:

91B14 Social choice
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