Hwang, Sung-Ha; Rey-Bellet, Luc Positive feedback in coordination games: stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule. (English) Zbl 1458.91032 Games Econ. Behav. 126, 355-373 (2021). Summary: We study the problem of stochastic stability for evolutionary dynamics under the logit choice rule. We consider general classes of coordination games, symmetric or asymmetric, with an arbitrary number of strategies, which satisfies the marginal bandwagon property (i.e., there is positive feedback to coordinate). Our main result is that the most likely evolutionary escape paths from a status quo convention consist of a series of identical mistakes. As an application of our result, we show that the Nash bargaining solution arises as the long run convention for the evolutionary Nash demand game under the usual logit choice rule. We also obtain a new bargaining solution if the logit choice rule is combined with intentional idiosyncratic plays. The new bargaining solution is more egalitarian than the Nash bargaining solution, demonstrating that intentionality implies equality under the logit choice model. Cited in 2 Documents MSC: 91A22 Evolutionary games 91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models Keywords:evolutionary games; logit choice rules; positive feedback; marginal bandwagon property; exit problems; stochastic stability; Nash demand games; Nash bargaining solution PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{S.-H. Hwang} and \textit{L. Rey-Bellet}, Games Econ. Behav. 126, 355--373 (2021; Zbl 1458.91032) Full Text: DOI arXiv References: [1] Acemoglu, D.; Johnson, S.; Robinson, J. A., Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth, (Handbook of Economic Growth 1A (2005)), 386-472 [2] Alós-Ferrer, C.; Netzer, N., The logit-response dynamics, Games Econ. Behav., 68, 413-427 (2010) · Zbl 1207.91017 [3] Arigapudi, S., Exit from equilibrium in coordination games under probit choice, Games Econ. 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