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Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium. (English) Zbl 1461.91055

Summary: Player-compatible equilibrium (PCE) imposes cross-player restrictions on the magnitudes of the players’ “trembles” onto different strategies. These restrictions capture the idea that trembles correspond to deliberate experiments by agents who are unsure of the prevailing distribution of play. PCE selects intuitive equilibria in a number of examples where trembling-hand perfect equilibrium [R. Selten, Int. J. Game Theory 4, 25–55 (1975; Zbl 0312.90072)] and proper equilibrium [R. B. Myerson, Int. J. Game Theory 7, 73–80 (1978; Zbl 0392.90093)] have no bite. We show that rational learning and weighted fictitious play imply our compatibility restrictions in a steady-state setting.

MSC:

91A26 Rationality and learning in game theory
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