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Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences. (English) Zbl 1466.91109

Summary: A (deterministic) social choice correspondence \(F\), mapping states into outcomes, is rationalizably implementable provided that there exists a mechanism such that the support of its set of rationalizable outcomes coincides with the set of outcomes recommended by \(F\). We provide a necessary condition for rationalizable implementation, called \(r\)-monotonicity. This condition, when combined with some other auxiliary conditions, is also sufficient when there are at least three agents.

MSC:

91B14 Social choice
91B03 Mechanism design theory
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