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The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games. (English) Zbl 0852.90134
Summary: For a class of infinite signaling games, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium strategies of finite approximating games converge to equilibrium strategies of the infinite game. This proves the existence of perfect Bayesian equilibrium for that class of games. It is well-known that in general, equilibria may not exist in infinite signaling games.

MSC:
91A05 2-person games
91B44 Economics of information
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