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Bargaining and value. (English) Zbl 0871.90118
Summary: We present and analyze a model of noncooperative bargaining among \(n\) participants, applied to situations describable as games in coalitional form. This leads to a unified solution theory for such games that has as special cases the Shapley value in the transferable utility (TU) case, the Nash bargaining solution in the pure bargaining case, and the recently introduced Maschler-Owen consistent value in the general nontransferable utility (NTU) case. Moreover, we show that any variation (in a certain class) of our bargaining procedure which generates the Shapley value in the TU setup must yield the consistent value in the general NTU setup.

91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91A12 Cooperative games
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