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A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems. (English) Zbl 1032.91020
Summary: A set of agents stand to receive a service. No two agents can be served simultaneously. A queue has to be organized, and agents having to wait should receive monetary compensations. We characterize the rule assigning positions in the queue and compensations corresponding to the payoffs recommended by the Shapley value of the associated cooperative game. We use a property of independence with respect to increase in some agents’ impatience, and an equal responsibility property.

91A12 Cooperative games
90B22 Queues and service in operations research
Full Text: DOI
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