An illustration of the essential difference between individual and social learning, and its consequences for computational analyses. (English) Zbl 1033.91039

Summary: Drawing a conclusion from recent insights in evolutionary game theory, we show that a so-called spite effect implies that there is an essential difference between individual and social learning. We illustrate its consequences for the choice of computational tools in economics and social settings in general by analyzing two variants of a genetic algorithm.


91E40 Memory and learning in psychology
91A26 Rationality and learning in game theory
91D99 Mathematical sociology (including anthropology)
Full Text: DOI


[1] Arifovic, J, Genetic algorithm learning and the cobweb model, Journal of economic dynamics and control, 18, 1, 3, (1993) · Zbl 0782.90017
[2] Axelrod, R, The evolution of strategies in the iterated Prisoner’s dilemma, () · Zbl 0904.90182
[3] Blume, L.E; Easley, D, What has the learning literature taught us?, ()
[4] Bosch-Domènech, A., Vriend, N.J., 1998. Do boundedly rational people imitate? Working Paper No. 379. Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of London.
[5] Ellison, G; Fudenberg, D, Rules of thumb for social learning, Journal of political economy, 101, 612-643, (1993)
[6] Fouraker, L.E; Siegel, S, Bargaining behavior, (1963), McGraw-Hill New York
[7] Friedman, M, The methodology of positive economics, (), 3-43
[8] Goldberg, D.E, Genetic algorithms in search, optimization, and machine learning, (1989), Addison-Wesley Reading MA · Zbl 0721.68056
[9] Hamilton, W, Selfish and spiteful behavior in an evolutionary model, Nature, 228, 1218-1225, (1970)
[10] Holland, J.H, Escaping brittlenessthe possibilities of general-purpose learning algorithms applied to parallel rule-based systems, (), 593-623
[11] Holland, J.H, Adaptations in natural and artificial systems, An introductory analysis with applications to biology, control, and artificial intelligence, (1992), MIT Press Cambridge, MA
[12] Huck, S., Normann, H.T., Oechssler, J., 1999. Learning in Cournot oligopoly – an experiment. Economic Journal.
[13] Levine, D.K., 1998. Modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiments. Review of Economic Dynamics.
[14] Marimon, R; McGrattan, E; Sargent, T.J, Money as a medium of exchange in an economy with artificially intelligent agents, Journal of economic dynamics and control, 14, 329-373, (1990) · Zbl 0698.90014
[15] Miller, J.H, The coevolution of automata in the repeated Prisoner’s dilemma, Journal of economic behavior and organization, 29, 87-112, (1996)
[16] Mitchell, M, An introduction to genetic algorithms, (1996), MIT Press/Bradford Cambridge, MA
[17] Offerman, T., Potters, J., Sonnemans, J., 1997. Imitation and belief learning in an oligopoly experiment (mimeo) University of Amsterdam, Department of Economics. · Zbl 1046.91051
[18] Palomino, F., 1995. On the survival of strictly dominated strategies in large populations. Institute for Economic Analysis WP 308.95. Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona.
[19] Rhode, P., Stegeman, M., 1995. Evolution through Imitation (with applications to duopoly). Working Paper E95-43. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics.
[20] Roth, A.E; Erev, I, Learning in extensive-form games: experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term, Games and economic behavior, 8, 164-212, (1995) · Zbl 0833.90144
[21] Schaffer, M.E, Evolutionary stable strategies for a finite population and a variable contest size, Journal of theoretical biology, 132, 469-478, (1988)
[22] Schaffer, M.E, Are profit maximizers the best survivors?, Journal of economic behavior and organization, 12, 29-45, (1989)
[23] Stanley, E.A., Ashlock, D., Tesfatsion, L., 1994. Iterated prisoner’s dilemma with choice and refusal of partners. in: Langton, C.G. (Ed.), Artificial Life III, vol. XVII, Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity, Addison-Wesley, Redwood, CA, pp. 131-175.
[24] Vega-Redondo, F, The evolution of Walrasian behavior, Econometrica, 65, 375-384, (1997) · Zbl 0874.90049
[25] Vriend, N.J, Artificial intelligence and economic theory, (), 31-47
[26] Vriend, N.J, Self-organization of marketsan example of a computational approach, Computational economics, 8, 205-231, (1995) · Zbl 0840.90016
[27] Vriend, N.J, Rational behavior and economic theory, Journal of economic behavior and organization, 29, 2, 263-285, (1996)
[28] Weibull, J, Evolutionary game theory, (1995), MIT Press Cambridge, MA · Zbl 0879.90206
This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. It attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming the completeness or perfect precision of the matching.