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Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities. (English) Zbl 1054.91029
The paper considers the case of auctions followed by an opportunity for resale where the bidder valuations are endogenously determined, reflecting anticipated profit from buying/selling in the resale market. To this end, it considers a two-stage model in which an auction in the first stage is followed by a resale auction, held by the first-stage winner. It also examines two cases, the case where resale takes place under complete information, and the case where the players have asymmetric information in the resale market.

MSC:
91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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