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Evolution of interdependent preferences in aggregative games. (English) Zbl 1065.91522
Summary: We study the evolution of preference interdependence in aggregative games which are symmetric with respect to material payoffs but asymmetric with respect to player objective functions. We identify a class of aggregative games whose equilibria have the property that the players with interdependent preferences (who care not only about their own material payoffs but also about their payoffs relative to others) earn strictly higher material payoffs than do the material payoff maximizers. Implications of this finding for the theory of preference evolution are discussed.

MSC:
91B08 Individual preferences
91A40 Other game-theoretic models
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