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Coordination of cooperative advertising in a two-level supply chain when manufacturer offers discount. (English) Zbl 1077.90009
Summary: We studied the coordination of cooperative advertisement in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain when the manufacturer offers price deductions to customers. With a price sensitive market, the expected demand with cooperative advertising and price deduction is demonstrated. When the manufacturer is a leader, we obtained the optimal national brand name investment, local advertisement and associated manufacturer’s allowance with any given price deduction. When the manufacturer offers more price deduction to customers, the retailer will increase local advertisement if the manufacturer provides the same portion of the local advertising allowance. We obtained the necessary and sufficient condition for the price deduction to ensure an increase of manufacturer’s profit, and a search procedure for determining such an optimal price deduction is provided as well. When the manufacturer and retailer are partners, we obtained the optimal national brand name investment and local advertisement. For any given price deduction, the total profit for the supply chain with cooperative scheme is always higher than that with the non-cooperative scheme. When price elasticity of demand is larger than one, the resulting closed form optimal price deduction with partnership is also obtained. To increase profits for both parties in a supply chain, we recommend that coordination in local and national cooperative advertising with a partnership relationship between manufacturer and retailer is the best solution. The bargaining results show how to share the profit gain between the manufacturer and the retailer, and determine the associated pricing and advertising policies for both parties.

MSC:
90B05 Inventory, storage, reservoirs
91A80 Applications of game theory
90B60 Marketing, advertising
91B60 Trade models
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