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Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions. (English) Zbl 1078.91007
Summary: We prove that when the number of (potential) buyers is at least three, every ex post equilibrium in the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves combinatorial auction mechanisms is a bundling equilibrium and is symmetric. This complements a theorem proved by R. Holzman, N. Kfir-Dahav, D. Monderer, and M. Tennenholtz [Games Econ. Behav. 47, No. 1, 104–123 (2004; Zbl 1077.91023)], according to which, the symmetric bundling equilibria are precisely those defined by a quasi-field.

91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Full Text: DOI
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