Vasin, A. A.; Durakovich, N. D. Models for non-cooperative foundation of competitive equilibrium. (Russian) Zbl 1086.91013 Èkon. Mat. Metody 41, No. 3, 68-79 (2005). Summary: The authors consider game theoretical models of unorganized market where large groups of economic agents change their initial endowments by repeated bargaining in pairs. The authors examine the relation between a sequential Nash equilibrium and a Walrass equilibriums in connection with the conditions of exchange. It is shown that a possibility for every agent to bargain many times is necessary for the convergence of the Nash equilibrium outcome to the Walrasian as the time of bargaining tends to infinity. Reviewer: Elena Glukhova (Moskva) MSC: 91A40 Other game-theoretic models 91A07 Games with infinitely many players 91B52 Special types of economic equilibria Keywords:sequential bargain; sequential Nash equilibrium; Walrass equilibriums PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{A. A. Vasin} and \textit{N. D. Durakovich}, Èkon. Mat. Metody 41, No. 3, 68--79 (2005; Zbl 1086.91013)