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On security of XTR public key cryptosystems against side channel attacks. (English) Zbl 1098.94614

Wang, Huaxiong (ed.) et al., Information security and privacy. 9th Australasian conference, ACISP 2004, Sydney, Australia, July 13–15, 2004. Proceedings. Berlin: Springer (ISBN 3-540-22379-7/pbk). Lecture Notes in Computer Science 3108, 454-465 (2004).
Summary: The XTR public key system was introduced at Crypto 2000. It is regarded that XTR is suitable for a variety of environments, including low-end smart cards, and XTR is the excellent alternative to either RSA or ECC. It was remarked that XTR single exponentiation (XTR-SE) is less susceptible than usual exponentiation routines to environmental attacks such as timing attacks and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). In this paper, however, we investigate the security of side channel attack (SCA) on XTR. This paper shows that XTR-SE is immune against simple power analysis under assumption that the order of the computation of XTR-SE is carefully considered. However, we show that XTR-SE is vulnerable to Data-bit DPA, Address-bit DPA, and doubling attack. Moreover, we propose countermeasures that prevent the proposed attacks. As the proposed countermeasure against doubling attack is very inefficient, a good countermeasure against doubling attack is actually necessary to maintain the advantage of efficiency of XTR.
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1053.94002].

MSC:

94A60 Cryptography
94A62 Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing
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