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Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chain agents: Review and extensions. (English) Zbl 1137.91320
Summary: This paper surveys some applications of cooperative game theory to supply chain management. Special emphasis is placed on two important aspects of cooperative games: profit allocation and stability. The paper first describes the construction of the set of feasible outcomes in commonly seen supply chain models, and then uses cooperative bargaining models to find allocations of the profit pie between supply chain partners. In doing so, several models are analyzed and surveyed, and include suppliers selling to competing retailers, and assemblers negotiating with component manufacturers selling complementary components. The second part of the paper discusses the issue of coalition formation among supply chain partners. An exhaustive survey of commonly used stability concepts is presented. Further, new ideas such as farsightedness among supply chain players are also discussed and analyzed. The paper also opens some avenues of future research in applying cooperative game theory to supply chain management.

MSC:
91A12 Cooperative games
90B05 Inventory, storage, reservoirs
90B35 Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research
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