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Approximations and well-posedness in multicriteria games. (English) Zbl 1138.91407
Summary: We address bargaining games where the agents have to take into account different criteria to value the decisions. We propose the class of generalized maximin solutions as the natural extension of the maximin solution concept in conventional bargaining games. In order to refine this solution concept, we define a multicriteria lexicographic partial ordering and present the class of generalized leximin solutions as those that are nondominated with respect to this relation. We establish some properties of these solutions and characterize them as solutions of multicriteria problems.

MSC:
 91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models 91A06 $$n$$-person games, $$n>2$$
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