An efficient protocol for secure two-party computation in the presence of malicious adversaries. (English) Zbl 1141.94362

Naor, Moni (ed.), Advances in cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2007. 26th annual international conference on the theory and applications of cryptographic techniques, Barcelona, Spain, May 20–24, 2007. Proceedings. Berlin: Springer (ISBN 978-3-540-72539-8/pbk). Lecture Notes in Computer Science 4515, 52-78 (2007).
Summary: Check if we can apply Woodruff’s method to our protocol. We show an efficient secure two-party protocol, based on Yao’s construction, which provides security against malicious adversaries. Yao’s original protocol is only secure in the presence of semi-honest adversaries. Security against malicious adversaries can be obtained by applying the compiler of Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson (the “GMW compiler”). However, this approach does not seem to be very practical as it requires using generic zero-knowledge proofs.
Our construction is based on applying cut-and-choose techniques to the original circuit and inputs. Security is proved according to the ideal/real simulation paradigm, and the proof is in the standard model (with no random oracle model or common reference string assumptions). The resulting protocol is computationally efficient: the only usage of asymmetric cryptography is for running \(O(1)\) oblivious transfers for each input bit (or for each bit of a statistical security parameter, whichever is larger). Our protocol combines techniques from folklore (like cut-and-choose) along with new techniques for efficiently proving consistency of inputs. We remark that a naive implementation of the cut-and-choose technique with Yao’s protocol does not yield a secure protocol. This is the first paper to show how to properly implement these techniques, and to provide a full proof of security.
Our protocol can also be interpreted as a constant-round black-box reduction of secure two-party computation to oblivious transfer and perfectly-hiding commitments, or a black-box reduction of secure two-party computation to oblivious transfer alone, with a number of rounds which is linear in a statistical security parameter. These two reductions are comparable to Kilian’s reduction, which uses OT alone but incurs a number of rounds which is linear in the depth of the circuit.
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1120.94002].


94A60 Cryptography
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