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Rapid evolution under inertia. (English) Zbl 1167.91319

Summary: This paper demonstrates that inertia driven by switching costs leads to more rapid evolution in a class of games that includes \(m\times m\) pure coordination games. Under the best-response dynamic and a fixed rate of mutation, the expected waiting time to reach long-run equilibrium is of lower order in the presence of switching costs, due to the creation of new absorbing states that allow G. Ellison’s [Rev. Econ. Stud. 67, No. 1, 17–45 (2000; Zbl 0956.91027)] “step-by-step” evolution to occur.

MSC:

91A15 Stochastic games, stochastic differential games

Citations:

Zbl 0956.91027
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References:

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