Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.; Maskin, Eric The folk theorem with imperfect public information. (English) Zbl 1177.91041 Fudenberg, Drew (ed.) et al., A long-run collaboration on long-run games. Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific (ISBN 978-981-281-846-1/hbk). 231-273 (2009). Reprinted from [Econometrica 62, No. 5, 997–1039 (1994; Zbl 0819.90137)]For the entire collection see [Zbl 1182.91012]. Cited in 1 ReviewCited in 2 Documents MSC: 91A20 Multistage and repeated games 91B44 Economics of information Keywords:folk theorem; imperfect observability; moral hazard; mechanism design; repeated games Citations:Zbl 0819.90137 PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{D. Fudenberg} et al., in: A long-run collaboration on long-run games. Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific. 231--273 (2009; Zbl 1177.91041)