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Social games: matching and the play of finitely repeated games. (English) Zbl 1201.91160

The authors provide a general framework and methodology for analyzing how matching and the play of games interact. They focus on favouring small populations in equilibrium play, and show how repetition can change behaviour.

MSC:

91D10 Models of societies, social and urban evolution
91B68 Matching models
91A20 Multistage and repeated games
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References:

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