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The truncated core for games with upper bounds. (English) Zbl 1211.91029
Summary: We define and study games with upper bounds. In one of these games there are upper bounds on the possible payoffs for some coalitions. These restrictions require adjustments in the definitions of solution concepts. In the current paper we study the effect of the restrictions on the core and define and study the so-called truncated core.

91A12 Cooperative games
Full Text: DOI
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