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A stochastic dynamic programming approach to decision making in arranged marriages. (English) Zbl 1229.90280

Summary: We employ a stochastic dynamic programming approach to study decision making by an individual wishing to have an arranged marriage. First, we show that this individual never opts out of a voluntarily agreed upon marriage. Second, we demonstrate that our marrying individual uses a reservation utility to determine which marriage proposal to accept. Third, we compute the expected length of time during which our marrying individual stays single. Finally, we focus on an arranged marriage market in which there are many identical marrying individuals and profit maximizing matchmaking firms. We show that profit maximization implies that all matchmaking firms offer marriage proposals whose utility equals the reservation utility of our marrying individuals.

MSC:

90C90 Applications of mathematical programming
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