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Pure-strategy Nash equilibria in an advertising game with interference. (English) Zbl 1237.91072
Summary: Two manufacturers produce substitutable goods for a homogeneous market. The advertising efforts of the two manufacturers determine the demand for the goods and interfere negatively with each other. The demand of each good is a piecewise linear function of the product goodwill, and the latter is a linear function of advertising efforts. In a game with two competing profit-maximizing manufacturers who have access to a set of several advertising media, the pure-strategy Nash equilibria are characterized and their existence is shown.

MSC:
91A80 Applications of game theory
90B60 Marketing, advertising
91A10 Noncooperative games
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