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Revisiting generalized Nash games and variational inequalities. (English) Zbl 1261.90065
Summary: Generalized Nash games with shared constraints represent an extension of Nash games in which strategy sets are coupled across players through a shared or common constraint. The equilibrium conditions of such a game can be compactly stated as a quasi-variational inequality (QVI), an extension of the variational inequality (VI). In [Eur. J. Oper. Res. 54, No.1, 81–94 (1991; Zbl 0754.90070)], P. T. Harker proved that for any QVI, under certain conditions, a solution to an appropriately defined VI solves the QVI. This is a particularly important result, given that VIs are generally far more tractable than QVIs. However F. Facchinei et al. [Oper. Res. Lett. 35, No. 2, 159–164 (2007; Zbl 1303.91020)] suggested that the hypotheses of this result are difficult to satisfy in practice for QVIs arising from generalized Nash games with shared constraints. We investigate the applicability of Harker’s result for these games with the aim of formally establishing its reach. Specifically, we show that if Harker’s result is applied in a natural manner, its hypotheses are impossible to satisfy in most settings, thereby supporting the observations of Facchinei et al. But we also show that an indirect application of the result extends the realm of applicability of Harker’s result to all shared-constraint games. In particular, this avenue allows us to recover as a special case of Harker’s result, a result provided by Facchinei et al. [loc. cit.], in which it is shown that a suitably defined VI provides a solution to the QVI of a shared-constraint game.

MSC:
90C33 Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) (aspects of mathematical programming)
91A10 Noncooperative games
91B50 General equilibrium theory
49J40 Variational inequalities
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