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Privacy in implementation. (English) Zbl 1392.91055
Summary: In most implementation frameworks, agents care only about the outcome and not at all about the way in which it was obtained. Additionally, typical mechanisms for full implementation involve the complete revelation of all private information. In this paper I consider the problem of full implementation with agents who may prefer to protect their privacy. I show that privacy-protecting implementation, while typically impossible with normal-form mechanisms, is achievable with extensive-form mechanisms.

MSC:
91B14 Social choice
91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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