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Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values. (English) Zbl 1457.91201

Summary: This paper presents a model for housing markets with interdependent values. We introduce private information on the quality of a house (i.e., high or low), which is known only to the initial owner. Interdependency means that the ex-post preference of an agent depends on the private information of the other agents with regard to the quality of houses. We prove that on a domain satisfying a richness condition, the no-trade rule is the only rule that satisfies ex-post incentive compatibility and ex-post individual rationality.

MSC:

91B32 Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
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