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On the values of Bayesian cooperative games with sidepayments. (English) Zbl 1461.91028

The author is concerned with the solution concept of value in transferable utility games with asymmetric information, and proposes a model in which contingent contracts are required to be incentive compatible, and thus utility might not be not fully transferable. Moreover, the model in which monetary transfers are modeled as additional sidepayments in a non-transferable utility game. The main result shows that Myerson’s generalization of the Shapley value and the Salamanca extension of the Harsanyi value are interim utility equivalent in this new model.

MSC:

91A12 Cooperative games
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References:

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