Ergin, Haluk; Sönmez, Tayfun; Ünver, M. Utku Efficient and incentive-compatible liver exchange. (English) Zbl 1466.91207 Econometrica 88, No. 3, 965-1005 (2020). Summary: Liver exchange has been practiced in small numbers, mainly to overcome blood-type incompatibility between patients and their living donors. A donor can donate either his smaller left lobe or the larger right lobe, although the former option is safer. Despite its elevated risk, right-lobe transplantation is often utilized due to size-compatibility requirement with the patient. We model liver exchange as a market-design problem, focusing on logistically simpler two-way exchanges, and introduce an individually rational, Pareto-efficient, and incentive-compatible mechanism. Construction of this mechanism requires novel technical tools regarding bilateral exchanges under partial-order-induced preferences. Through simulations we show that not only can liver exchange increase the number of transplants by more than 30%, it can also increase the share of the safer left-lobe transplants. Cited in 1 Document MSC: 91B68 Matching models Keywords:market design; liver exchange; matching; incentive compatibility; efficiency PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{H. Ergin} et al., Econometrica 88, No. 3, 965--1005 (2020; Zbl 1466.91207) Full Text: DOI