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Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research. (English. Russian original) Zbl 1471.91082

Autom. Remote Control 82, No. 7, 1119-1143 (2021); translation from Avtom. Telemekh. 2021, No. 7, 3-36 (2021).
Summary: We describe prerequisites for the emergence of the key concept of incentive compatibility in the theory of active systems and mechanism design and give a survey of approaches to this problem, which have led to stating the fair play and revelation principles, and of current trends in this branch of scientific knowledge. Potential difficulties and development prospects are discussed.

MSC:

91B03 Mechanism design theory
91B14 Social choice
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