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Traffic congestion pricing via network congestion game approach. (English) Zbl 1479.91029

Summary: This paper investigates the optimization of traffic congestion systems via network congestion game approach. Firstly, using the semi-tensor product (STP) of matrices, the matrix expression of network congestion game is obtained. Secondly, a necessary and sufficient condition is proposed to guarantee that the traffic systems can be transformed into network congestion game with given performance criterion as its weighted potential function. Then an algorithm is provided to design the traffic congestion price in the case that conversion can be established. Thirdly, by designing proper learning rule, the optimization of traffic systems can be achieved when individuals optimize their own utility function. Moreover, two special cases which make our results more accord with reality and rich. Finally, an example is exploited to demonstrate the effectiveness of our obtained results.

MSC:

91A14 Potential and congestion games
91A80 Applications of game theory
90B20 Traffic problems in operations research
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