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Dynamic games of common-property resource exploitation when self-image matters. (English) Zbl 1479.91052

Dawid, Herbert (ed.) et al., Dynamic analysis in complex economic environments. Essays in honor of Christophe Deissenberg. Cham: Springer. Dyn. Model. Econom. Econ. Finance 26, 81-107 (2021).
Summary: The purpose of this paper is to model the influence of Kantian moral scruples in a dynamic environment. Our objectives are twofold. Firstly, we investigate how a Nash equilibrium among agents who have moral scruples may ensure that the exploitation of a common-property renewable resource is Pareto efficient at every point of time. Secondly, we outline a prototype model that shows, in an overlapping generation framework, how a community’s sense of morality may evolve over time and identifies conditions under which the community may reach a steady-state level of morality in which everyone is perfectly Kantian.
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1465.91003].

MSC:

91A25 Dynamic games
91B76 Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.)
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