Van Long, Ngo Dynamic games of common-property resource exploitation when self-image matters. (English) Zbl 1479.91052 Dawid, Herbert (ed.) et al., Dynamic analysis in complex economic environments. Essays in honor of Christophe Deissenberg. Cham: Springer. Dyn. Model. Econom. Econ. Finance 26, 81-107 (2021). Summary: The purpose of this paper is to model the influence of Kantian moral scruples in a dynamic environment. Our objectives are twofold. Firstly, we investigate how a Nash equilibrium among agents who have moral scruples may ensure that the exploitation of a common-property renewable resource is Pareto efficient at every point of time. Secondly, we outline a prototype model that shows, in an overlapping generation framework, how a community’s sense of morality may evolve over time and identifies conditions under which the community may reach a steady-state level of morality in which everyone is perfectly Kantian.For the entire collection see [Zbl 1465.91003]. MSC: 91A25 Dynamic games 91B76 Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) Keywords:tragedy of the commons; dynamic games; Nash equilibrium; self-image; categorical imperative PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{N. Van Long}, Dyn. Model. Econom. Econ. Finance 26, 81--107 (2021; Zbl 1479.91052) Full Text: DOI Link