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Pricing and energy efficiency decisions by manufacturer under channel coordination. (English) Zbl 1524.90036

Summary: The profit level of the green supply chain under two decision modes is explored in cooperative and non-cooperative games, where the variable decision timing in direct channel and retail channel within the manufacturer management is studied based on the theory of observable delay game. This paper discusses how the total profit of the green supply chain can realize the profit of the inferior copy of the superior under the two decision-making modes. In the existing literature, it is usually assumed that the pricing decisions of the manufacturers and retailers are made simultaneously. In this study, our model takes into account not only the decision on the pricing, but also on the product innovation. Decision makers can choose the levels of the decision variables as well as the decision times. The observable delay game theory is applied to the study of the decision-making of price levels and energy efficiency levels in multi-channel supply chains. Early pricing decisions can be extended to the study of the product development process. This is more in line with the development of the market in reality. The results of our model show that: (a) an increase of the product efficiency innovation by the manufacturers will lead to an increase in the demand at the retail channel; (b) the enhancement of consumers’ awareness of the environmental protection and the improvement of the price sensitivity of the double-channel crossing have positive effect on the profit level of the general channel; (c) the manufacturers are motivated to adopt a marketing strategy that masks disadvantages with advantages. After the manufacturer determines the energy efficiency level of the product, it is found that the direct channel to increase the pricing decision time and the creation of input from a high cost are more conducive to achieving higher revenue; (d) after comparing the total profits of the two decision models, the manufacturer can obtain all the surplus profit of the retailer by coordinating the fixed fee of the two-part tariff contract. At the same time, the perfect replication of decentralized decision-making and the total profit level of centralized decision-making are realized. Through the coordination of the choice of variable pricing time and tariff contract, not only the perfect Nash equilibrium of non cooperative game is formed, but also the optimal variable decision-making scheme of multi-channel green supply chain is provided for manufacturers to maximize their profits.

MSC:

90B06 Transportation, logistics and supply chain management
91A10 Noncooperative games
91A12 Cooperative games
91A80 Applications of game theory
90B50 Management decision making, including multiple objectives
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