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Strategic games. I, II. (Czech) Zbl 0208.47303

Kybernetika, Praha 3, Suppl. 1-96 (1967); 4, Suppl., 97-216 (1968).

MSC:

91Axx Game theory
91-01 Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance
91-00 General reference works (handbooks, dictionaries, bibliographies, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance
00A06 Mathematics for nonmathematicians (engineering, social sciences, etc.)
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References:

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