Bargaining sets of cooperative games without side payments. (English) Zbl 0212.25102


91A12 Cooperative games
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[1] Aumann, R. J.; Peleg, B., Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments, Bull. Amer. Math. Soc., 66, 173-179 (1960) · Zbl 0096.14706
[2] Aumann, R. J. and Maschler, M., The bargaining set for cooperative games. To appear inAdvances in Game Theory, M. Dresher, L. S. Shapley and A. W. Tucker, eds.Annals of Mathematics Studies, No. 52, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J. · Zbl 0132.14003
[3] Davis, M.; Maschler, M., Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games, Bull. Amer. Math. Soc., 69, 106-108 (1963) · Zbl 0114.12501
[4] Eilenberg, S. and Montgomery, D., 1946, Fixed point theorems for multi-valued transformations,Amer. J. Math., 214-222. · Zbl 0060.40203
[5] Peleg, B., Existence theorem for the bargaining setM_1^i, Bull. Amer. Math. Soc., 69, 109-110 (1963) · Zbl 0114.12502 · doi:10.1090/S0002-9904-1963-10881-2
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