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Mares, Milan

General coalition-games. (English) Zbl 0387.90116

Kybernetika, Praha 14, 245-260 (1978).
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Cited in 2 Reviews
Cited in 10 Documents

MSC:

91A12 Cooperative games
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\textit{M. Mares}, Kybernetika 14, 245--260 (1978; Zbl 0387.90116)
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References:

[1] R. J. Aumann M. Maschler: The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games. Annals of Math. Studies, No. 52 (1964), 443-476. · Zbl 0132.14003
[2] R. D. Luce H. Raiffa: Games and Decisions. Introduction and Critical Surmey. J. Wiley & Sons, New York 1957. · Zbl 0084.15704
[3] M. Mareš: Stability of Coalition Structures and Imputations in Coalition-Games. Kybernetika 10 (1974), 6, 461-490. · Zbl 0304.90135
[4] M. Mareš: On Cooperative Games Connected with Markets. Kybernatika 12 (1976), 6, 451-461. · Zbl 0358.90081
[5] M. Mareš: Strong Solution of General Coalition-Games. Transactions of the 8th Prague Conference on Information Theory, Statistical Decision Functions, Random Processes, Prague 28. 8. - 1.9. 1978. Academia, Praha 1978.
[6] J. von Neumann O. Morgenstern: Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour. Princeton 1944. · Zbl 0205.23401
[7] J. Rosenmüller: Kooperative Spiele und Märkte. Lecture Notes in Oper. Res. and Math. Syst. 53, Springer Verlag, Berlin-Heidelberg-New York 1971. · Zbl 0235.90070
[8] K. Winkelbauer: Strategické hry. Kybernetika 3-4 (1967-68), supplement.
[9] M. Mareš: Dynamic Solution of General Coalition-Game. Kybernetika 14 (1978), 4, 261 - 284. · Zbl 0391.90106
[10] A. Perez: \(\epsilon\)-Admissible Simplifications of the Dependence Structure of a Set of Random Variables. Kybernetika 13 (1977), 6, 439-449. · Zbl 0382.62003
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