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The aspiration approach to predicting coalition formation and payoff distribution in sidepayment games. (English) Zbl 0504.90093
Summary: This paper presents the aspiration approach to coalition formation and payoff distribution in games with sidepayments. The approach is based on the idea that players set prices for their participation within coalitions. The solution space which is appropriate for price-setting players is different from that of the usual solution concepts and is called the space of aspirations. Solution concepts defined on the space of aspirations correspond to notions of how players bargain over their prices. Once the players choose a vector of prices, the coalitions which can afford to pay these prices are the coalitions which are predicted to form in the game.

MSC:
91A12 Cooperative games
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