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A generalized Nash-Cournot model for the northwestern European natural gas markets with a fuel substitution demand function: the GaMMES model. (English) Zbl 1332.91079
Summary: This article presents a dynamic Generalized Nash-Cournot model to describe the evolution of the natural gas markets. The major players along the gas chain are depicted including: producers, consumers, storage and pipeline operators, as well as intermediate local traders. Our economic structure description takes into account market power and the demand representation tries to capture the possible fuel substitution that can be made between the consumption of oil, coal, and natural gas in the overall fossil energy consumption. We also take into account long-term contracts in an endogenous way, which makes the model a Generalized Nash Equilibrium problem. We discuss some means to solve such problems. Our model has been applied to represent the European natural gas market and forecast, until 2030, after a calibration process, consumption, prices, production, and natural gas dependence. A comparison between our model, a more standard one that does not take into account energy substitution, and the European Commission natural gas forecasts is carried out to analyze our results. Finally, in order to illustrate the possible use of fuel substitution, we studied the evolution of the natural gas price as compared to the coal and oil prices.

91B74 Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.)
91A80 Applications of game theory
91B54 Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand)
PATH Solver
Full Text: DOI
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