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Bargaining in cooperative games. (English) Zbl 0661.90107
This paper introduces a new solution concept for cooperative games without sidepayments, called the aspiration bargaining set, and proves that this set is nonempty for a wide, and economically interesting, class of games.
Reviewer: E.Bennett

MSC:
91A12 Cooperative games
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