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CoSMed: a confidentiality-verified social media platform. (English) Zbl 1451.68167

Blanchette, Jasmin Christian (ed.) et al., Interactive theorem proving. 7th international conference, ITP 2016, Nancy, France, August 22–25, 2016. Proceedings. Cham: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 9807, 87-106 (2016).
Summary: This paper describes progress with our agenda of formal verification of information-flow security for realistic systems. We present CoSMed, a social media platform with verified document confidentiality. The system’s kernel is implemented and verified in the proof assistant Isabelle/HOL. For verification, we employ the framework of Bounded-Deducibility (BD) Security, previously introduced for the conference system CoCon. CoSMed is a second major case study in this framework. For CoSMed, the static topology of declassification bounds and triggers that characterized previous instances of BD security has to give way to a dynamic integration of the triggers as part of the bounds.
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1343.68004].

MSC:

68Q60 Specification and verification (program logics, model checking, etc.)
68V15 Theorem proving (automated and interactive theorem provers, deduction, resolution, etc.)
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