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Review of cryptographic schemes applied to remote electronic voting systems: remaining challenges and the upcoming post-quantum paradigm. (English) Zbl 1391.94779
Summary: The implantation of Remote Electronic Voting (REV) systems to Electoral Processes is happening at a slower pace than anticipated. One of the relevant factors explaining that reality is the lack of studies about the Cryptographic Schemes and Primitives applied to the existing REV solutions. In this paper, the authors review the main cryptographic schemes applied to date, as well as the most relevant Post Quantum research in the field. The aim is twofold: contribute to clarify the strengths and weaknesses of each scheme as well as expose the remaining challenges, as a necessary step towards a broader introduction of REV solutions in binding elections.
94A60 Cryptography
Akiss; BKZ; FHEW; HElib; Helios
Full Text: DOI
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