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Social acceptability of Condorcet committees. (English) Zbl 1444.91089
Summary: We define and examine the concept of social acceptability of committees in multi-winner elections context. We say that a committee is socially acceptable if each member in this committee is socially acceptable, i.e., the number of voters who rank her in their top half of the candidates is at least as large as the number of voters who rank her in the least preferred half, otherwise she is unacceptable. We focus on the social acceptability of \((q-)\) Condorcet committees, where each committee member beats every non-member by a (qualified) majority, and we show that a \((q-)\) Condorcet committee may be completely unacceptable, i.e., all its members are unacceptable. However, if the preferences of the voters are single-peaked or single-caved and the committee size is not “too large” then a Condorcet committee must be socially acceptable, but if the preferences are single-crossing or group-separable, then a Condorcet committee may be socially acceptable but may not. Furthermore, we evaluate the probability for a Condorcet committee, when it exists, to be socially (un)acceptable under impartial anonymous culture (IAC) assumption. It turns to be that, in general, Condorcet committees are significantly exposed to social unacceptability.
91B14 Social choice
91B12 Voting theory
Convex; Normaliz
Full Text: DOI
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