Milgrom, Paul; Roberts, John Rationalizability, learning, and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities. (English) Zbl 0728.90098 Econometrica 58, No. 6, 1255-1277 (1990). Summary: We study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition, macroeconomic coordination failures, arms races, bank runs, technology adoption and diffusion, R & D competition, pretrial bargaining, coordination in teams, and many others. For all these games, the sets of pure strategy Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and rationalizable strategies have identical bounds. Also, for a class of models of dynamic adaptive choice behavior that encompasses both best-response dynamics and Bayesian learning, the players’ choices lie eventually within the same bounds. These bounds are shown to vary monotonically with certain exogenous parameters. Cited in 3 ReviewsCited in 249 Documents MSC: 91A10 Noncooperative games 91B62 Economic growth models 68T05 Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence Keywords:supermodular games; iterated dominance; noncooperative games; oligopoly; pure strategy Nash equilibria; correlated equilibria; rationalizable strategies; Bayesian learning; bounds PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{P. Milgrom} and \textit{J. Roberts}, Econometrica 58, No. 6, 1255--1277 (1990; Zbl 0728.90098) Full Text: DOI